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Abstract 
Escalation is a common and costly problem among IT projects. Although the potential of de-escalation 
of commitment to failing courses of action has been much heralded, many such efforts may result in 
failure due to constituencies biasing facts in the direction of previously accepted beliefs, and 
therefore, prevent an organization from de-escalating. Here, we adopt Lewin’s change framework to 
examine the commitment transformation during the transition from escalation to de-escalation of an e-
procurement project in a local government organization in UK. Our findings suggest that the entire 
process of ‘unfreezing-changing-refreezing’ was enacted through the deployment of behaviour 
disconfirmation, psychological safety creation, and development, alignment and integration of new 
attitudes and behaviours. The research and practical implications of these findings are explored.  
Keywords: Escalation of commitment, de-escalation of commitment, Lewin’s change theory. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper is about de-escalation of commitment to information technology (IT) projects; more 
specifically, it addresses the all too common failure of such efforts to overcome commitment to 
present failing course of action and accept alternative course of action. The problem of escalation of 
commitment to IT projects has attracted tremendous attention in recent years (Newman and 
Sabherwal, 1996; Keil, 1995). This may be explained by the alarming findings from the Standish 
Group’s 1998 survey, which indicates that 74 percent of software projects were behind schedule and 
over budget - a behaviour underlying the phenomenon of escalation of commitment to a failing course 
of action (Brockner, 1992). The high incidence of software projects exhibiting the escalating 
phenomenon is due to a combination of many different factors categorised as project, psychological, 
social and organizational factors (Staw and Ross, 1987).  
Experts have suggested that the most effective way to eradicate the phenomenon of escalation of 
commitment to IT projects is through de-escalation of commitment (Keil and Robey, 1999). Keil and 
Robey (1999, p.65) define de-escalation of commitment as ‘the reversal of escalating commitment to 
failing courses of action, either through project termination or redirection’. This implies that troubled 
projects must be detected as early as possible so that corrective actions can be taken before the project 
conditions worsen. However, despite the significant role played by de-escalation of commitment in 
unlocking the escalation entrapment, there has been a paucity of research on de-escalation of 
commitment in the information systems (IS) area (Heng et al., 2003). Particularly, little is known 
about the process of how actors alter their commitment from present failing course of action to an 
alternative course of action, during the transition from escalation to de-escalation. This paper argues 
that understanding actors’ commitment transformation processes during the transition is extremely 
important for consensus building among various stakeholders toward the alternative course of action, a 
criteria essential for carrying out any exit strategy (Montealegre and Keil, 2000).  
Specifically, this paper draws from the literature on Lewin’s (1951) theory of change to explore the 
dynamic process of commitment transformation during the transition from project escalation to de-
escalation in an organizational setting. Against such a backdrop, we undertook exploratory research 
into a case study of an electronic procurement (e-procurement) development project in a regional UK 
metropolitan borough council (UKC) (a pseudonym). Our two research questions are: 1) what are the 
inertias that inhibit actors from overcoming their commitment to the failing course of action? And 2) 
what are the drivers that enable actors to accept alternative courses of action? We will address the two 
research questions in subsequent sections. 
2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
2.1 Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action 
Escalation of commitment is a phenomenon which refers to situations where decision makers commit 
additional resources to a failing course of action (Staw and Ross, 1987). The escalation phenomenon 
has been explained using several theories. Among the theories, self-justification theory (Brockner, 
1992) and the prospect theory (Whyte, 1986) provide the most complete explanation of the escalation 
phenomenon. Based on the theories, Staw and Ross (1987) develop four types of determinants of 
commitment, namely, project, psychological, social and structural. These determinants have been used 
to explain the escalation phenomenon in various settings (Newman and Sabherwal, 1996; Ross and 
Staw, 1993).  
The phenomenon of escalation of commitment is also widely observed in IS projects as Keil and Mann 
(1997) report that up to 30 to 40 percent of IS projects have some degree of escalation of commitment 
to a failing course of action. A review of the IS literature reveals several IT projects that exhibit 
escalation of commitment. The Taurus project (Drummond, 1996), the CONFIG project (Keil, 1995), 
Centco (Newman and Sabherwal, 1996) and the Denver international airport (Montealegre and Keil, 
2000) are just a few prominent examples of escalating situations identified in IS settings. To alleviate 
the impacts of project escalation, Keil and Robey (1999), suggest an effective way of reducing 
commitment to a failing course of action, which is through de-escalation of commitment to a failing 
course of action.   
2.2 De-escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action 
To date, research on de-escalation of commitment is relatively limited (Drummond, 1995). Most of the 
studies are conducted in non-IS settings (Ross and Staw, 1993) and only very few are related to IT 
projects (Keil and Robey, 1999; Montealegre and Keil, 2000; Heng et al., 2003). Keil and Robey 
(1999) and subsequently, Montealegre and Keil (2000) have provided a very useful summary of 
triggering activities and conditions that can promote de-escalation. Some of these conditions were 
inferred from closely related disciplines such as organizational psychology, but others were grounded 
in software development projects. These de-escalation strategies and tactics help to either enhance de-
escalation tendencies or reduce preexisting forces for commitment. A review of the de-escalation 
studies in the IS literature highlights a knowledge gap, which is conceptualising the transformation of 
actors’ commitment during the transition from escalation to de-escalation of commitment. While 
Montealegre and Keil (2000) have offered a process perspective on how de-escalation can take place, 
very little information is unveiled regarding how actors overcome their previous failing courses of 
action either on their own or through the influence of other actors. Furthermore, the more important 
issue of gaining consensus among actors toward the alternative course of action remains unaddressed.  
2.3 Adopting Lewin’s Theory of Change  
Lewin’s (1951) theory of change can be used as a lens to conceptualise the inertias and enablers of the 
transformation of actors’ commitment during the transition from escalation to de-escalation. 
Generally, the theory evolves around a basic change model of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing. 
The model perceives human change as a ‘profound psychological dynamic process that involved 
painful unlearning without loss of ego identity, and difficult relearning as one cognitively attempted to 
restructure one’s thoughts, perceptions, feelings, and attitudes’ (Schein, 1996, p. 27). The model 
assumes that the change involves actors’ attitudes and values, and the unlearning of the present set of 
behaviours is initially inherently painful. In addition, the model also suggests change as a multistage 
process and all stages must be negotiated before a stable change can be said to have taken place 
(Schein, 1988). So far, the model has been used widely in the Organizational Development area 
(Marshak, 1993), but more recently, also in IS research (Wastell et al., 2003).  
The concept of deploying IT to bring about organizational transformation is not new in the IS area 
(Wastell et al., 2003), but examining the actors’ commitment change in the transition from escalation 
to de-escalation is still exploratory. Figure 1 showing Lewin’s stages and steps - a tentative framework 
for addressing our research questions and is also the framework we adopt for guiding our study. The 
framework suggests that unfreezing can only take place when there is motivation to change, and such 
motivation could either be self-induced or influenced by peers (Wastell et al., 2003). Unfreezing tends 
to generate a certain extent of psychological struggle within individuals, which can often be inherently 
painful. The change process involves the development of new attitudes based on new information and 
cognitive redefinition. Generally, learning takes place during the changing phase. Refreezing, it is 
believed, can only begin when new attitudes and behaviours are adopted. Finally, before relearning 




















Figure 1.  A Process Framework of Commitment Transformation during the Transition from 
Escalation to De-escalation 
3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
Our strategy was to undertake an in-depth case research (Klein & Myers, 1999) of an e-procurement 
project conducted in UKC. We did not consider laboratory experiments since the subjects may not 
have the same emotional attachments as managers personally involved in an IS development project 
(Brockner, 1992). The case study approach is particularly appropriate for our exploratory study since it 
allows us to better capture the organizational dynamics of the phenomenon (Newman and Sabherwal, 
1996). Its strength also lies in its ability to explain the phenomenon based on the interpretation of data.  
The research access was negotiated with the organisation in December 2001. From January 2002 to 
August 2002, we conducted our data collection. When we began our field research in January 2002, 
the organisation had just decided to continue and try to turnaround the failing project. It was in the 
midst of preparing its turnaround strategies. Therefore, we were able to clearly capture the dynamics 
of the de-escalation process necessary to answer our two research questions. Primarily, semi-
structured interviews and informal discussions were conducted with all the relevant project 
stakeholders (Klein & Myers, 1999). These semi-structured interviews were taped-recorded with 
interviewees’ permission and transcribed immediately after the meetings. Twenty-eight interviews 
were conducted, each lasting an average of one and a half hours involving altogether seventeen 
interviewees. Semi-structured interviews and observation were the main sources of our data because 
the researcher could grasp the interviewees’ interpretations of their actions and events, as well as their 
beliefs and aspirations. Secondary data such as reports, memos and meeting minutes were also 
gathered to supplement the information collected through the interviews.  
As a first step in our analysis, the first author used the interview transcripts to prepare a detailed case 
description containing a summary of the entire development process. Major events, key actors and the 
actions taken during the development process, were identified and summarized. The data were 
validated with several individuals who were familiar with the project’s history. To reduce researcher 
bias, the project information was shown to the other authors who were uninvolved with data 
collection, to identify portions containing actors’ commitment and actions taken that influence their 
participations in the de-escalation process. The entire data analysis process went through numerous 
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iterations to formulate a coherent and consistent overview of the case organization, with each iteration 
cycle, following the hermeneutic circle principle to case study development (Klein and Myers, 1999). 
 
4 CASE STUDY: UKC  
4.1 Background of the E-procurement Project and Why It Went Wrong 
UKC is a UK municipal borough with an elected council that serves a local population of 221,000 
residents and provides a large range of services. The idea of electronic government (e-government) 
originates from the central government’s 1999 white paper, Modernizing Government which 
challenged all public sector organizations to achieve “citizen-centred services”, by integrating policies 
and programs, “joining-up” delivery, harnessing the power of IT, and getting the best out of staff. The 
White Paper committed the government to the “use of new technology to meet the needs of citizens 
and business and not trail behind technology development”. The overall champion for the e-
government initiative was the cabinet deputy of the council, who was assigned a special post known as 
the "E-envoy". His main responsibility was to propel the e-government initiative within UKC. In 2000, 
there was a need to revamp the existing purchasing function in order to meet the target set within the 
e-government strategy plan that 100% of the goods purchased by the council had to be purchased 
electronically by 2005. Besides that, there were also other considerations for the UKC to implement 
the e-procurement system. These reasons included improving purchasing efficiency, setting up a cost 
control mechanism, and a strong desire to be the first local council in UK to purchase goods and 
services electronically. The council head gave full support for the project and the 12- month project 
was launched in January 2001 with an initial estimated cost of £150,000. The project was headed by 
the IS manager, who was supervised by an e-procurement committee formed by a group of senior 
managers within the council. An external software vendor, selected through a bidding system, helped 
to develop the software. Other key stakeholders include the internal users of the system such as the 
chief procurement officer, corporate service manager, corporate affairs manager, technical service 
manager and the e-business manager. External users would include goods and services suppliers.  
The project faced several problems during its early stage of development. The main problem 
concerned conflicts among the IS project manager, the users and the IS contractor over design issues. 
On the one hand, internal users complained about the low quality of the software and the failure of the 
contractor to understand their requirements. On the other hand, the IS project manager and the IS 
contractor were dissatisfied with the indecisiveness of the users and pinpointed their frequent requests 
for design change as the main reason for delaying project development. The project initially stalled 
due to a disagreement between the users and the IS contractor. It all started when the IS contractor 
demanded an additional £150,000 for “redesigning the software again”. Their reason was that since 
the contract price was ‘fixed’, any changes to the software after the users signed off the earlier 
versions of software prototypes were chargeable. However, the users disagreed with their claim 
because they viewed those changes as alterations resulting from the contractor’s mistakes, rather than 
additions requested by them. Eventually, the e-procurement steering committee intervened and agreed 
to make the additional payment. As one of the committee members explained, “What were we going to 
tell everybody if the project did not succeed? The stakes were very high and we could not disappoint 
them”. 
After the committee’s intervention, the project managed to continue for another two months before it 
finally collapsed. The same problems resurfaced and the users refused to continue participation in 
project development. Instead, they proposed the purchase of e-procurement packaged software. At the 
same time, the IS project manager seemed to lose control of the project and was busy haggling with 
the IS contractor over the issue of what requests were categorised as “additions” or “alterations”. 
Despite this dire situation the e-procurement committee did not intervene directly, except for insisting 
to the users that the project had to be continued. However, they did promise more resources. While the 
users were resolute about project abandonment, the IS project manager however, insisted that they 
should continue. He explained, “How could we give up? With all the resources invested, the option of 
reverting back to buying packaged software was unimaginable”. At that stage, the project had already 
exceeded £350 000 and was six months behind schedule.  
4.2 The Transition from Escalation to De-escalation 
Refusing to continue with the troubled project, one of the users decided to blow the whistle on the 
project by reporting to the E-envoy. She explained why she blew the whistle, “I believed the 
involvement of the E-envoy would resolve the entanglement. The committee and the project manager 
were too optimistic and irrational, from my perspective”. In December 2001, the E-envoy was 
informed and was surprised at the problems facing the project. He explained why the news came as a 
surprise to him, “I had delegated the project manager and the e-procurement steering committee to 
lead the project. Besides, even at the bi-monthly management meetings over the past few months, the 
committee members did not inform me of any problem arising”. Immediately, he delayed the 
development project indefinitely until a decision had been made. To resolve the problems, the E-envoy 
gathered all internal and external stakeholders including representatives from the IS contractor and the 
goods and services suppliers, to reconfirm his commitment to the project. He stated a strong desire for 
the project to be continued rather than abandoned and was very confident of a project turnaround. He 
commented, “It was important for everyone to understand my standpoint, especially in that state of 
confusion. Besides, those problems could be easily resolved as long as everyone was committed to 
turn the troubled project around”. 
Once everyone had agreed to continue the troubled project, the E-envoy organized a focus group 
meeting with the e-procurement steering committee, the IS project manager, the user managers and the 
IS contractor to re-examine for the first time their previous problems. With the E-envoy’s presence 
and participation, everyone showed great enthusiasm in the meeting. At the beginning of the meeting, 
the E-envoy delivered a speech to explain the significance of the meeting, “I simply assured them that 
no individuals would be punished in this project. I also stressed that turning around the failing project 
was our utmost priority in order to salvage our reputation and the confidence the external 
constituencies had in us”. The assurance from the E-envoy was well received by everyone present in 
that meeting as they began to discuss their differences openly. They were unafraid of highlighting their 
mistakes. In that meeting, several problems were identified. Sensing the e-envoy’s determination to 
succeed, all relevant stakeholders arrived at a multilateral consensus to attempt to turn the project 
around. The IS project manager explained the change of attitude, “Basically, he [the e-envoy] banged 
all our heads together. All he wanted was to try and get the cohesion of the team back. We promised 
him that we would get together and work out the differences”. Despite the successful turnaround of the 
attitudes, the IS project manager did admit that it was a very difficult phase, “We felt relieved that the 
e-envoy accepted our apologies for the earlier mess and it also took several of us quite a while to 
restore our confidence that a turnaround was indeed possible”. Furthermore, it was also discovered 
later that any packaged software would need a large degree of customisation, which supposedly might 
take up to 6-9 months. The chief procurement officer admitted, “It was unsuitable for the council as 
the customisation process would be too long for the project”.  
Having identified the problems, the whole team started to explore alternative courses of action. For the 
first time, with the participation of the E-envoy and the e-steering committee, the three groups (the 
user managers, the IS project manager and the IS contractor) started to cooperate and work towards a 
common goal. The team proposed the adoption of a partial abandonment strategy, which was to reduce 
the original scope of the project without causing significant changes to its original specification. For 
that reason, three user departments were short listed as the pilot sites, hence allowing the IS project 
manager to deal with the needs of only three user departments rather than eight departments formerly. 
Furthermore, the project had been separated in three stages. Instead of implementing full scale 
procurement functions all at one go, the first stage would now focus on the ‘front purchasing process’ 
which included only ordering, issuing of purchase orders and delivery of items. The e-envoy 
concluded, “By reducing the scope, certainly enhanced our chances of success”. Sensing the E-
envoy’s determination to succeed, all relevant parties arrived at a multilateral consensus to draw up a 
list of turnaround tactics. The list is summarised in table 1. 
 
Problems identified in the earlier development 
process 
Remedies planned as part of the turnaround 
strategies 
Ambitious project scope - implementation across 
eight user departments  
Reducing the project scope – implementation  
across only three user departments 
Ineffective project strategy – ‘big bang’ approach  Adopting an alternative project strategy – incremental 
approach 
Involvement of too many stakeholder 
representatives 
Reducing the number of stakeholder representatives in 
a stakeholder group  
Low product quality and poor service performed 
by the IS contractor 
Requesting to deal with a new team which included a 
senior project manager from the IS contractor 
The irrational composition of user representatives 
in the project group 
Involving users who were handling  
purchasing transactions on a day-to-day basis 
No direct communication between the 
users and the IS contractor 
Allowing direct communications between the  
users and the IS contractor 
Varying level of stakeholder commitment  Obtaining fully committed users by excluding non-
committed user departments from the pilot tests 
Little involvement in the development process by 
the e-envoy and the e-procurement steering 
committee 
Close monitoring from the e-envoy and the e-
procurement steering committee. Weekly progress 
meetings were planned 
Inflexible ‘fixed price contract’ Restructuring of the original contract 
No changes should be allowed after signing off the 
prototype 
Strictly enforcing the ‘no change’ rule after a prototype 
was signed off 
 
Table 1.       A list of Problems Identified in the Earlier Development Process and Remedies Planned 
as Part of the Turnaround Strategies 
In February 2002, the E-envoy ordered a stakeholder analysis before carrying out the action plans. The 
purpose was to find out whether all internal and external constituencies fully supported the devised 
turnaround strategies. The E-envoy reckoned that a new stakeholder analysis must be performed since 
actors involved in the development process could still be strongly committed to the prior failing course 
of action. The e-procurement steering committee members carried out the stakeholder analysis. For 
those who still had some doubts, the e-envoy and the committee members spent considerable effort to 
convince them. One of the committee members explained what they did, “we simply made sure that 
everyone felt comfortable with the exit strategy. We also encouraged project members to discuss 
among themselves to see if the exit strategy was the best available option”. All the changes were 
implemented immediately and they produced remarkable results. One of the user manager commented, 
“With fewer users, things seemed to progress smoothly and quickly. I would think that everyone of us 
was determined to make this work. Even the contractor came to meetings two or three times a week. 
The new team seemed to show more enthusiasm and commitment. In addition, the committee’s close 
monitoring kept all of us on our toes”. When the first phase of the e-procurement system finally went 
‘live’ in August 2002, the project was eight months behind schedule and close to £500,000 over its 
original budget. The relatively smooth implementation after the adoption of the de-escalation strategy 





Given that people have a tendency to remain committed to previously accepted beliefs and 
preferences, it is possible for various constituencies to try to prevent an organization from carrying out 
de-escalation of commitment (Drummond, 1995). Therefore, this paper argues that understanding the 
process of how actors overcome their commitment to a previous failing course of action and 
subsequently, jointly agreed to an exit strategy becomes important in facilitating a de-escalation 
strategy. Our finding concurs with previous research that the de-escalation process is a complex and 
gradual process (Montealegre and Keil, 2000), and actors played key roles in facilitating the de-
escalation strategy (Heng et al., 2003). By applying the steps provided by the process framework 
shown in figure 1, we analyze in the following section how actors surrender their commitment to a 
previous failing course of action and accept a jointly agreed exit strategy. 
5.1 Lesson 1: Failing Course of Action was Disconfirmed – Unfreezing Stage 
Lewin (1958) suggests that change is only possible when present behaviour must fail to be confirmed 
over a period of time. In other words, it could be when a group discovers its behaviour does not lead to 
expected outcomes or may even lead to undesirable outcomes. However, often in projects, a strongly 
held conviction and the refusal to let inevitable setbacks undermine it are just reasons why bad 
projects are so hard to kill (Royer, 2003). Furthermore, it may also be difficult to obtain accurate 
information about project status or the principals may be “economical” with the truth (Keil and Robey, 
2001).  
In the case of UKC, the disconfirmation arose when the users refused to continue participation in the 
development process. The project had failed to proceed beyond prototyping and the users were 
disillusioned about its prospect and therefore, initiated the change. By informing the e-envoy 
regarding the status of the troubled project, the users relieved themselves from the perceived 
disadvantage of the micro-politics of being in a minority, which was ‘the rest against one’ 
(Drummond, 1995). The perceived power of the e-envoy had set up sufficient guilt or anxiety to 
motivate a change among the actors (Schein, 1996). If the users had not involved the e-envoy, the 
discomfort would be at a low level, which would be dealt with by denial or by avoidance of the 
disconfirming source. A good example of avoidance is ‘when the e-procurement committee did not 
intervene at all, except for insisting the users that the project had to be continued’. Therefore, e-
envoy’s intervention clearly imposed pressure on the rest of the project members and the committee 
members, which made them realize that they had failed to live up to his expectations. The discomfort 
in terms of guilt and anxiety would motivate the actors to turn the troubled project around since they 
would probably be eager to prove that the earlier mistakes were attributed to external reasons and not 
poor individual ability (Gundlach et al., 2003).   
5.2 Lesson 2: Psychological Safety was provided for Project Members– Unfreezing Stage 
The creation of psychological safety, either by removing barriers to change or by eliminating the threat 
inherent in the past failures can motivate change (Schein, 1988). Weick and Quinn (1999) suggest that 
a change agent plays a crucial role in making people feel secure and capable of changing without 
reducing the validity of the disconfirming information. This is important because people are willing to 
give up the present course of action and to enter the uncertainty of learning something new, only if 
they feel secure. Correspondingly, in an IS project environment, it is vital for managers to reduce the 
severity of penalties for failure to avoid escalation of commitment (Newman and Sabherwal, 1996; 
Keil, 1995). As Heng et al., (2003) clearly point out in their experiment, providing assurance proved 
useful in facilitating de-escalation of commitment. 
In the UKC case, the e-envoy adopted a proactive collective approach of resolving the crisis. His main 
emphasis was on restoring the cohesiveness of the team. His assurance that no individuals would be 
punished for earlier problems came as a significant relief for the project members as they openly 
discussed their individual shortcomings that had occurred in the earlier development process. It was 
through such open communication that the whole team started to click and work toward a common 
goal of project turnaround. However, it must be pointed out that it was difficult for project members to 
balance painful disconfirming messages with reassurance that change was possible, as our interview 
data suggested, ‘it also took several of us quite a while to restore our confidence that a turnaround was 
indeed possible’. Clearly, this resembles Montealegre and Keil‘s (2000) description of a gradual 
consensus building process.  
5.3 Lesson 3: Project Members Developed New Attitudes and Behaviours– Changing Stage 
Schein’s (1996) work suggests that change occurs through cognitive restructuring in which words are 
redefined to mean something other than previously assumed, concepts are interpreted more 
extensively, or new standards of judgment and evaluation are learned. When unfreezing occurs and 
people are motivated to learn something, they tend to be especially attentive to ideas that are in 
circulation, a mechanism called translation (Weick and Quinn, 1999). In many situations, people 
develop new attitudes by identifying with a role model or scanning the environment for information 
relevant to the change (Schein, 1988). This explains why changes in top management or project 
championship is important to trigger de-escalation since it allows a fresh appraisal of the project as 
project members tend to identify with their leader (Ross and Staw, 1993). 
In the case of UKC, the e-envoy became the target of identification, as his stance became the new 
attitudes or behaviours to be learned by the project members. For instance, the e-envoy simply decided 
that the project had to be continued rather than abandoned and insisted that ‘it was important for 
everyone to understand my standpoint’. Furthermore, there were several examples in the case, which 
also illustrated how the e-envoy influenced the project group’s attitudes and behaviours. These 
examples are ‘with the E-envoy’s presence and participation, everyone showed great enthusiasm in the 
meeting’ and ‘sensing the E-envoy’s determination to succeed, all relevant parties arrived at a 
multilateral consensus’. Besides identification, people may also collect other sources of information to 
develop new attitudes. For instance, the users abandoned the idea of replacing the software 
development with packaged software because they learnt that any packaged software would need a 
large degree of customization, which supposedly might take up to 6-9 months and was deemed 
unsuitable for the council. Scanning for information from the environment is common in projects, for 
example when consultants were employed to review troubled projects in the Taurus project 
(Drummond, 1996) and the Denver International Airport project (Montealegre and Keil, 2000). 
5.4 Lesson 4: Project Members Aligned and Integrated the New Attitudes and Behaviours – 
Refreezing Stage 
Weick and Quinn (1999) suggest that the most difficult stage in a change process is behaviour 
alterations. In the action stage, Schein (1988) suggests that induced attitudinal changes usually do not 
last because the new things learnt either do not fit into the person’s total personality or are incongruent 
with his tolerance level. Beer et al (1990) point out that it is common for most people who reach the 
action stage to relapse and change back to a previous course of action. Even in project settings, 
integrating new attitudes and behaviours seem challenging simply because belief is a powerful 
sentiment and sometimes this ‘faith’ can be so hard to kill (Royer, 2003). In IT project environments, 
Montealegre and Keil (2000) found that the collective belief among project members was so 
widespread that the project had been institutionalized. Therefore, where alignment and integration of 
new attitudes and behaviour are concerned, special efforts are necessary to deinstitutionalize the 
project. 
In the case of UKC, the e-procurement committee conducted a stakeholder analysis before carrying 
out the action plans, to find out whether all internal and external constituencies fully supported the 
devised turnaround strategies. It was necessary to ensure that new attitudes and behaviours had been 
aligned and integrated before any change could be stabilized. As for those who still had some doubts, 
influence tactics were deployed to ensure that the newly adopted attitudes were congruent with 
individuals’ beliefs. During this period, negotiations were also carried out for consensus building 
(Montealegre and Keil, 2000). Furthermore, the e-envoy also encouraged the project group to 
reinforce the new behaviours in each other. This guaranteed the behaviour patterns learnt and 
reinforced collectively that ultimately become part of individuals’ behaviour repertoire (Royer, 2003). 
Figure 2 represents the commitment transformation process during the transition from escalation to de-










Figure 2.        Commitment Transformation during the Transition from Escalation to  
         De-escalation at UKC 
6 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have argued that unfreezing of commitment to a failing course of action is critical if 
de-escalation is to be effected. It is clear that the entire process of ‘unfreezing-changing-refreezing’ 
has occurred in the case of UKC, and enacted through the deployment of behaviour disconfirmation, 
psychological safety creation, cognitive redefinition and finally, new attitude and behaviour alignment 
and integration. The process framework developed here has important implications for both research 
and practice. For researchers, this paper makes a contribution by providing a process framework to 
examine commitment transformation during the transition from escalation to de-escalation. Though 
previous studies have identified several triggering activities that promote de-escalation, little is known 
about commitment transformation during the transition from escalation to de-escalation, for which our 
framework can serve as the basis for further de-escalation research. For practitioners, this study 
provides managers with useful insights on how to gain project members’ commitment to alternative 
course of action. In addition, the UKC case underscores the need for managers to be aware of barriers 
threatening the transformation of commitment. Perhaps, strategies and tactics can be deployed to 
ensure that the commitment transformation process is smoothly facilitated. There are two major 
limitations in this paper. First, the use of ‘change management’ metaphors in this paper may have 
implied that change is seen as necessarily desirable and inevitable, but in fact it is contingent and 
contested. Second, the Lewin’s metaphor may be outdated and too mechanistic (Beer and Nohria, 
2000) for today’s fast-changing and complex organizations. Despite the limitations, we are convinced 
that this study is still very useful since project escalation is a common and costly problem among IS 
development projects (Keil, 1995), and there can be no question about the importance of a deeper 
understanding of its nature and avoidance (Newman and Sabherwal, 1996). Finally, while this study 
 
       Stage 1: Unfreezing               Stage 2: Changing            Stage 3: Refreezing  
                
    Failing Course of                 Project Members Developed        Project Members Aligned 
        Action was Disconfirmed    New Attitudes and                        and Integrated the         
                           Behaviours             New Attitudes and  
        Psychology Safety was                            Behaviours 
        Provided for Project                           
        Members 
 
     Escalation         De-escalation 
represents an important step toward understanding de-escalation, longitudinal field studies that involve 
multiple case studies are clearly called for, to reflect the diversity of commitment change dynamics. 
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